We explore the complementarities between high-skill emigration and poverty in developing countries. We build a model endogenizing human capital accumulation, high-skill migration and productivity. Depending on the magnitude of the key elasticities, the model economy displays a unique stable long-run equilibrium or multiple stable equilibria, implying that two countries sharing the same characteristics may end up either in a "low poverty-low brain drain" path or in a "high poverty-high brain drain" path. After identifying country-specific parameters, we find that, for a majority of countries, the observed equilibrium has higher income than the other possible one. In 22 developing countries (including 20 small states with less than 2 million inhabitants), poverty and high brain drain are worsened by a coordination failure. For 25 other countries, the risk of a radical worsening of economic performances is high. These results are fairly robust to identification assumptions and the inclusion of a brain gain mechanism.
Introduction
Many observers and scholars have long considered the brain drain as a curse for origin countries in general, and for the developing world in particular. Although the new literature is less pessimistic and shows that positive spillovers can be induced by high-skill emigration, it is fairly obvious that the brain drain affects human capital accumulation and economic performances of sending countries. It is also largely recognized that lack of economic growth and rampant poverty (going hand in hand with discriminations, political repression and lack of freedoms) is what motivates people to flee their own country.
The interdependencies between high-skill emigration and poverty in developing countries are key to understand the process of development. They can be the source of vicious and virtuous circles linked to strategic complementarities in individual migration decisions. Indeed, when a significant brain drain movement is initiated, it might have damaging effects on the economy and induce other waves of high-skill emigration. On the contrary, when a significant movement of return operates, it gives incentives to other waves of returnees to come home.
History has shown that massive and rapid outflows of high-skill people can generate hardly reversible economic damages. An interesting case is that of Iran, where pre-revolutionary economic development was rapid, though unevenly distributed among Iranians. The Iranian brain drain started with the 1978-1979 cultural revolution and was exacerbated in the early 1980s during the war with Irak and after the decision of the government to reform Iran's higher education system. The trend continued afterwards and is seen by many observers as one of the most important exodus of talented faculty, students, and researchers. The pace of growth had slowed dramatically after the revolution and Iran is still a lower-middle income economy today. Since 2002, Iran's parliament has tried to reverse its brain drain but returns are still sporadic.
A more recent example is the one observed in the former Soviet states. Many scientists and academics went abroad after independence. Russian or Moldovian trade unions report that between half a million and a million scientists and professionals have left the country since 1991. This has deteriorated the economic situation and working conditions at origin; hence, almost none of them have returned.
Breaking such vicious circles requires major reforms (of democratic or dictatorial types 1 ).
In the 1980s, the return of educated elites and high-skill workers played a crucial role in Taiwan's economic takeoff, starting with the development of the information industry in Hsinchu. The Irish case is another nice illustration of the vicious and virtuous effects of high-skill mobility. On the one hand, a wave of mass emigration of university and college graduates was observed in the 1980s. This brain drain sucked the marrow out of Ireland's social and economic development. On the other hand, the major fiscal reforms embraced after 1987 attracted foreign companies and investments. The Irish miracle was on track and since the late nineties, a huge movement of return migration has operated and contributed to the "Irish miracle".
The question addressed in this paper is: can a "high brain drain-high poverty"situation be the result of a coordination failure, or is the brain drain an inevitable corollary of poverty, just making the situation slightly worse? For each developing country, the data set compiled by Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009) gives precise information on the human capital level of residents and emigrants abroad. In 2000, the average skill-ratio (i.e. ratio of tertiary to non-tertiary educated workers) of high-income countries was 0.243 (with values above 1 in the US and Canada). At the same year, 23 developing countries would exhibit a skill-ratio above 0.243 if all high-skill emigrants returned home. Saint Kitts and Nevis (0.866) would be close to the US and Canada; Grenada (0.611) and Dominica (0.471) and other small states would be close to Australia (0.514). Other larger countries such as the Philippines (0.333), Peru (0.309), Jamaica (0.279) or Latvia (0.271) would have more human capital than many Western European countries. If such returns were important enough to generate a rapid takeoff and eradicate incentives to emigrate, brain drain and poverty could be seen as resulting from a coordination failure. If not, the brain drain just worsens the situation. The goal of this paper is to address this issue using an integrated model of human capital accumulation, high-skill emigration and economic performances.
Surprisingly, the bi-directional causal link between emigration and poverty has only been separately investigated unidirectionally in the recent brain drain literature. (a) On the one hand, many empirical studies focusing on the determinants of migration flows usually disregard the composition of these flows. Among them, a few recent contributions have taken advantage of new databases on international migration by education level to investigate the determinants of the brain drain and the skill composition of emigration flows. Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk (2007) showed that the brain drain increases with political instability and professional qualifications trained in East Germany. In the summer of 1961, construction began at night and the city of Berlin was being walled off. Stopping the vicious circle of brain drain and impoverishment (and the considerable abuse of the East-German education system) were the main economic reasons for the building of the Berlin wall.
the degree of fractionalization, and decreases with the level of development at origin. Grogger and Hanson (2008) found that a simple model of income maximization can account for positive selection (higher emigration rates for the skilled) and positive sorting (positive effect of wage differentials on the share of skilled in bilateral migration). Rosenzweig (2007 Rosenzweig ( , 2008 used micro-data to demonstrate that there are larger per-capita numbers of foreign students in the United States from lower skill-price countries than from high skill-price countries, and host countries with higher skill prices attract more foreign students. These studies clearly reveal that the size and structure of international migration flows are clearly endogenous and depend on the economic characteristics of source and host countries. In the empirical literature, these characteristics are usually treated as exogenous (or instrumented). (b) On the other hand, another literature focuses on the consequences of the brain drain on the welfare of those left behind. The first welfare theorem suggests that labor mobility increases the total amount of welfare at the world level. It is Pareto-improving if those gains can be appropriately redistributed among all parties concerned. When redistribution is impossible or costly, some parties can be adversely affected although the size of the pie is enlarged. This argument can be decisive for those left behind if there are strong complementarities between skilled and unskilled workers on the labor market or if the fiscal cost of education is large and totally supported by residents at origin. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974 ) or McCullock and Yellen (1975 , 1977 were the first to stress the negative impact of the brain drain for developing countries. The brain drain was seen as a zero sum game with the rich countries getting richer and the poor countries getting poorer. Later, relying on the existence of externalities linked to human capital, the endogenous growth framework offered an appropriate environment to demonstrate that any loss of human capital can be detrimental for remaining households (e.g., Miyagiwa, 1991, Haque and Kim, 1995) . We refer to this view as the "traditional" brain drain literature. On the contrary, a newer literature (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1998; and Beine et al., 2001) suggests that the emigration of skilled workers can increase sending-country educational investments or induce other positive feedback effects.
In particular, prospects of emigration to countries where skills are rewarded more generously can lead not only to increased investment in skills before migration (ex-ante), but also to a larger higher-educated domestic population after migration (ex-post).
2 We refer to this view as the "brain gain" literature. A problem with these "traditional" and "brain gain" models is that they usually ignore the endogeneity of the emigration probability.
In the paper, we build bridges between these two strands of literature and develop a richer model allowing for coordination failures. We first consider the traditional view and disre- Iran). Given their size, these numbers represent relatively small proportions of their educated labor force (2.4 percent in Russia and 14.7 in Iran). These proportions are too low to be the fruit of coordination problems. For most large countries, the bad long run equilibrium is irrelevant, as it would entail one-hundred-percent brain drain. Nevertheless, 27 of them exhibit a non-trivial bad equilibrium with reasonably higher brain drain and poverty; these 27 countries thus face an important risk of radical worsening of their economic performances.
These results are fairly robust to our identification strategy and to the inclusion of "brain gain" mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework and derives the conditions under which multiplicity is obtained. Our benchmark model follows the 'traditional' literature on brain drain and development, i.e. considers the brain drain as unambiguously detrimental for human capital accumulation. In Section 3, we use macrodata to calibrate the benchmark model on developing countries and to identify country-specific characteristics. This allows us to characterize the type of equilibrium observed in each developing country.
In Section 4, we analyze the robustness of our results to identifying assumptions and account for the recent "brain gain" literature. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Theory
Our model depicts a developing economy with endogenous technology, high-skill emigration and human capital accumulation. Time is discrete. One period is meant to describe the active life of one generation.
Each developing country is characterized by a linear production function with two perfectly substitutable inputs, high-skill and low-skill labor (H t and L t ), and an endogenous productivity factor λ t :
where ω < 1 is the average productivity of low-skill workers relatively to high-skill workers. Hence, high-skill workers' income is equal to λ t whereas low-skill workers earn ωλ t . The assumption of perfect substitutability of the two types of labor is made for mathematical simplicity.It obviously implies that the skill premium is exogenous. This is in line with Rosenzweig (2007 Rosenzweig ( , 2008 ) who shows that cross-country differences in skill prices are much more affected by differences in base wages (λ t ) than by differences in returns to skills (1/ω). In addition, many empirical studies advocate using a high elasticity of substitution to match data on skill premium in developing countries.
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We consider a Lucas-type technological externality (see Lucas, 1988) and assume that the scale productivity factor is a concave function of the skill-ratio in the resident labor force. Hence, we have
where A is a country fixed effect, γ t is a time trend which is common to all developing and developed countries (γ > 1), and α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of productivity to the skill-ratio.
Preferences are represented by an indirect utility function assumed to be logarithmic in income. Low-skill individuals are immobile across countries whereas high-skill individuals have the choice between staying in their country or emigrating to a richer industrialized country before entering the labor market. Migration is permanent and we disregard the links between migrants and their origin country (such as remittances or diaspora externalities).
Productivity or income at destination is exogenous and denoted by λ t =Āγ t withĀ > 0.
We do not endogenizeĀ as a function of the skill-ratio at destination, implicitly assuming that high-skill immigration from each developing country is too small to affect productivity. Hence, our model is only relevant to the analysis of developing countries.
Migration induces heterogenous moving costs which must be subtracted from the utility level. We denote the migration cost byε i for individual i. Hence, migration is optimal for individual i if and only if
At time t, all individuals with migration costs below a critical value ε t find it optimal to emigrate. The critical value is given by
The threshold ε t is decreasing with the skill-ratio k t and characterizes the income differential (in logs) with high-income destinations. At the margin, the size of migration costs for the individual who is indifferent between migrating or staying is equal to the income differential.
It can reasonably be used as an index of poverty (or underdevelopment) of the country.
Migration costs are distributed according to a cumulative distribution function G(ε) with location parameter m and dispersion parameter b. Hence, G t = G(ε t ) measures the proportion of high-skill emigrants at time t, i.e. the rate of brain drain. We impose the following assumption on G(ε).
Assumption 1 The distribution function of migration costs satisfies
As it will appear later, Assumption 1 will be a sufficient condition to obtain multiplicity of equilibria and coordination failures. It holds when G ′ (ε) goes to 0 much faster than exp (−ε/α) as ε goes to infinity. This implies that the migration choice is sensitive enough to the wage differential when this differential is large.
Assumption 1 is always verified in the case where the cumulative distribution function G(ε)
reaches one for a value of x ∈ R. It is also always satisfied if G(ε) is a normal distribution with positive mean, or if G(ε) is a Gumbel distribution with positive location. If G(ε) is a logistic distribution, Assumption 1 holds provided that b, the scale of the distribution, is larger than α.
At this stage, it is useful to distinguish k t , the skill-ratio in the ex-post (or after-migration) resident labor force and z t , the skill-ratio in the ex-ante (or before-migration) native labor force. Since only educated workers migrate at a rate G(ε t ), we obviously have
The dynamics are governed by human capital accumulation. For simplicity, it is assumed that high-skill workers educate all their children whereas low-skill workers only educate a fraction q ∈ (0, 1) of them. q is assumed exogenous. Denoting the skilled population Z s and the low-skill population Z u , their dynamics are given by
Where n s and n u measure the numbers of children in high-skill and low-skill households.
Denoting by n = n s /n u the relative number of children in high-skill households (in proportion of the number observed in low-skill households), we have
Our model is made of equations (1) to (5). In these equations, we consider that parameters A > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and n ∈ (0, 1) are identical across developing countries. The other exogenous parameters A, q, m and b are country-specific characteristics. Hence, a developing country can be identified as following:
Definition 1 A developing country is a quadruple Ω = {A, q, m, b}representing the technological fixed effect (A > 0), the fraction of educated children in low-skill households (q ∈ (0, 1)), the location and the scale parameters of the distribution of migration costs
The parameters and country characteristics determine the level and the time path of the two main endogenous variables, the index of poverty ε t and the ex-ante skill-ratio z t . Indeed, when trajectories for ε t and z t are known, it is straightforward to compute the trajectories of the other endogenous variables (λ t , Y t , k t ). In other words, the system (1)-to-(5) can easily be reduced into a two-variable system. We have:
Definition 2 Given an initial skill-ratio in the native labor forcez 0 > 0, an inter-temporal equilibrium with migration is a vector of skill-ratios {z t } t≥0 ∈ R ∞ + and a vector of poverty indexes {ε t } t≥0 ∈ R ∞ such that z 0 =z 0 and ∀t ≥ 0:
Equation (6) is a static incentive compatibility condition. For a given ex-ante skill-ratio z t , it characterizes the combination(s) of poverty index ε t and high-skill emigration rate G(ε t ) compatible with the technology level and households' emigration decisions at time t.
Equation (7) is dynamic and characterizes human capital accumulation. For a given ex-ante skill-ratio and poverty index at time t, it gives the ex-ante skill-ratio at time t + 1.
We have the following result:
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, there exists a thresholdẑ such that, in equilibrium, z t >ẑ ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof. We proof the lemma using a Reductio ad absurdum. Suppose we have an equilibrium with, at some date s, z s <ẑ. We will show that there would be no ε s satisfying ε s −f (ε s , z s ) = 0, that is, Equation (6). Solving (6) for z s we obtain
The function φ(ε) is continuous. Its limit when ε → −∞ is equal to +∞. Under Assumption 1, its limit when ε → +∞ is equal to +∞. It therefore has a global minimum at somê ε. This global minimum should satisfy:
Let us defineẑ = φ(ε). There is no ε ∈ R such that φ(ε) <ẑ. As a consequence there is no ε ∈ R solving (6) for z <ẑ. Hence, when z s <ẑ, (6) could not hold and this cannot be an equilibrium.
We now introduce a second assumption, which is by now way crucial for the following results, but greatly simplifies the analysis.
Assumption 2 The distribution function of migration costs is such that there is a unique
This implies the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any level z t >ẑ there exists two values of ε t ,
Proof. Consider the function z = φ(ε) ⇔ ε − f (ε, z) = 0. We have seen in the above proof that it goes from +∞ to +∞ as ε goes from −∞ to +∞, and has a global minimum at the point (ε,ẑ). Assumption 2 implies that this function changes slope only once, at its minimum. As a consequence, for any z t >ẑ, there are two values of ε t solving ε t − f (ε t , z t ) = 0. Let us denote these two solutions s
The solution s + (z t ) corresponds to a high poverty index and high brain drain: the ex-post skill ratio k t is much below the ex-ante level z t and the productivity level is low. Solution s − (z t ) corresponds to a low poverty index and low brain drain: the ex-post skill ratio k t is closer to the ex-ante level z t and the productivity level is higher. At each t, there are therefore two values of z t+1 compatible with Equations (6)- (7). The dynamics can be written as:
If these two values are aboveẑ, we can compute four values of z t+2 using (6)- (7), etc... Hence there is a possibility for an infinite number of equilibria, starting from the initial condition
In order to describe more precisely the possible long-run outcomes, we list here some properties of the two functions h(s + (z t ), z t ) and h(s − (z t ), z t ).
• since φ ′ ε < 0 for ε <ε, and s − (z t ) is a decreasing function, the function h(s − (z t ), z t ) is increasing in z t ;
• since s
• When z tends to infinity, the function h(s − (z t ), z t ) tends to the oblique asymptote obtained under G(ε) = 0:
• When z tends to infinity, the function h(s + (z t ), z t ) tends to the horizontal asymptote obtained under G(ε) = 1: q 1 − q Figure 1 represents a dynamic correspondence which satisfies the properties derive above.
The following proposition summarizes the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 an inter-temporal equilibrium exists under the following conditions.
When h(ε,ẑ) >ẑ, if z 0 >ẑ, an equilibrium exists.
When h(ε,ẑ) <ẑ,
• if h(s − (z), z) < z for all z > 0, no equilibrium exists.
• if there existsz > 0 such that h(s − (z),z) <z and ifz 0 ≥ z, where z is the smallest steady state of the dynamics z t+1 = h(s − (z t ), z t ), an equilibrium exists.
Proof. When h(ε,ẑ) >ẑ, z 0 >ẑ ensures that there exists at least one inter-temporal equilibrium satisfying the monotone dynamics
below the forty-five degrees line for all z t , all the possible dynamics starting fromz 0 are decreasing, and there will be inevitably some date T at which z t <ẑ. Hence, there exists no inter-temporal equilibrium.
When h(ε,ẑ) <ẑ, if there existsz > 0 such that h(s
cuts the forty-five degrees line at some point; let us denote z the smallest steady state of the dynamics z t+1 = h(s − (z t ), z t ). Provided thatz 0 ≥ z , there exists at least one inter-temporal Obviously, as soon as one inter-temporal equilibrium exists, an infinite number of such equilibria exist.
The key condition separating the two cases of Proposition 1, h(ε,ẑ) >ẑ, can be expressed explicitly as a condition on the productivity parameter A in the case where the function G(ε) is a Gumbel distribution, which is a common assumption in endogenous migration models given the nice mathematical properties of that distribution:
Using this functional form for G(), we can solve the inequality h(ε,ẑ) <ẑ for the parameter A:
Hence, the no-existence of equilibrium can only arise when productivity is small enough, given the other parameters.
We now derive some comparative static results in the context of a Gumbel distribution of migration costs. Results can be obtained for the point p = {ẑ, h(ε,ẑ)}:
. We first compute h(ε,ẑ) which gives:
Using the partial derivatives ofẑ and h(ε,ẑ) with respect to the parameters of interest, q, n, m, and Φ we get:
Equations (10) and (11) indicate that when q or n increases, the point p moves vertically upward. The conditions for existence would be unchanged in the case where h(ε,ẑ) >ẑ (ẑ is unchanged) or easier to fulfill in the case where h(ε,ẑ) <ẑ as the smallest steady state z would be lowered. If the slope of the function does not change too much (which is what simulations indicate), it would also imply that the high steady state would be higher.
This implies that education policies and/or population policies increasing n make the good stationary equilibrium better.
Equations (12) and (13) show that increasing location m or decreasing Φ (i.e. increasing productivity A) move the point p unambiguously to the South-West. Hence it enlarges the scope for existence of equilibrium (ẑ is lower).
Quantitative assessment
The goal of this section is to calibrate common and country-specific parameters, to draw the dynamic correspondence for each developing country, and to determine whether the observed situation corresponds to the high brain drain or to the low brain drain path. We use data on highly skilled emigration stocks/rates and on the labor force by education level from the Appendix (available upon request). Three levels of education are distinguished, individuals with upper-secondary education, those with less than upper-secondary and those with postsecondary education. High-skill workers are those in the latter category. Data on GDP are from the Penn World Tables. Our calibration is based on the year 2000 and is summarized in Table 1 . 
Calibration of common parameters
Remember we consider that parameters α ∈ (0, 1) (the elasticity of productivity to the skillratio),Ā > 0 (productivity in leading countries), and n ∈ (0, 1) (the fertility differential between high-skill and low-skill workers) are identical across developing countries.
To calibrate α, we regress ln λ j,t on ln k j,t .Data on the labor force by education level are used to compute k j,t . The numbers of high-skill, low-skill and medium-skill resident workers (H j,t , L 1 j,t , L 2 j,t ) are available for each country j from the Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk's database for 1990 and 2000. High-skill workers (H j,t ) are those with post-secondary education. In the low-skill group, we distinguish workers with upper secondary education (L 1 j,t ) and those with less than upper secondary (L 2 j,t ). The skill-ratio in the resident labor force is given by
To compute λ j,t , we use equation (1) given estimates of the relative productivity of low-skill and medium-skill workers, ω 1 and ω 2 . In a sample including many developing countries, Rosenzweig (2007 Rosenzweig ( , 2008 estimated an average return to schooling between 7 and 10 percent per year.Considering that high-skill workers have 15 more years of schooling than the low skilled and 6 more years than the medium skilled, this gives 0.21 < ω 1 < 0.34 and 0.56 < ω 2 < 0.67. In our simulations, we use ω 1 = 0.25and ω 2 = 0.60. Given GDP data, the productivity scale factor of country j is obtained as a residual:
We use data for 1990 and 2000, normalize γ 00 to unity and γ 90 = A 90 /A 00 in equation (2).
Regressing ln λ j,t /γ t on ln k j,t gives an estimate for α. Using a large sample of developing countries (142 observations), we obtain an elasticity of 0.277, significant at 1 percent (the R-squared of the regression is equal to 0.24). This elasticity will be used in the benchmark simulation. Using a larger sample of 195 developing and developed countries, we obtain an elasticity of 0.447 (the R-squared is equal to 0.38). This larger value will be used in the robustness analysis.
The calibrated productivity in leading countries,Ā, is the weighted average of the productivity scale factors obtained from (15) for 9 major destination countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom and the United States). The weights are the country's shares in the total labor force of the group. We obtainĀ = 64.18.
Using data from Kremer and Chen (1999) , we compute the differential fertility for 1985-89 for 26 developing countries (to our knowledge there is no broader set of data on differential fertility than this one). The correlation between country-specific fertility differentials and human capital of women is low (14 percent) so that we can consider the fertility differential as independent on the level of development. The average fertility differential between high-skill (more than 10 years of education) and low-skill workers (less than 10 years of schooling) amounts to 0.605. We use this value for n in all countries.
Calibration of country-specific characteristics
As stated in Definition 1, each developing country j is characterized by a quadruple of parameters Ω j = {A j , q j , m j , b j } representing the technological fixed effect (A j > 0), the fraction of educated children in low-skill households (q j ∈ (0, 1)), the location and the scale parameters of the distribution of migration cost (m j ∈ R,b j > 0).
The calibration of the technological fixed effect A j is done at the year 2000. We use equation (2) and the estimated value for α. We have:
where k 2000,j and λ 2000,j are given by equations (14) and (15).
To calibrate q j , we use the dynamic equation (5) are taken from Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009) . Generally speaking, the skill level of immigrants in non-OECD countries is expected to be very low, except in a few countries such as South Africa, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, some Eastern Asian countries such as Singapore or Hong Kong. Focusing on OECD destinations, the database should capture a large fraction of the worldwide educated migration (a portion between 80 and 90 percent), but is also likely to underestimate the number of emigrants from several developing countries located at the neighborhood of important destinations. Here, we have collected or estimated data from non-OECD destinations to expand the coverage of the above studies. We double the number of destinations, adding 31 non OECD destinations, and compute more accurate measures of the brain drain for all the world countries and characterize "South-South" and "North-South" emigration patterns. As expected, the inclusion of non OECD countries such as the Gulf states, South Africa, or Singapore has a impact on the brain drain of neighboring countries. Our method is explained in an Appendix. Equation (5) can be rewritten as
Solving for q j yields:
For all countries excepted Saint Kitts and Nevis (q = 0.4574), we have q < 1 − n so that the oblique asymptote on Figure 1 has a slope lower than one.
Finally, we have to specify a functional form for the distribution of migration costs and estimate its parameters. In the benchmark analysis, migration costs are assume to follow a Gumbel distribution with country-specific parameters m ∈ R (location) and b > 0 (scale). The mean and variance of the distribution is related to the location and scale parameter as follows: mean = m − γb where γ is the Euler's constant (0.577), and variance = π 2 b 2 /6.
The Gumbel distribution is a continuous probability distribution belonging to the family of generalized extreme value distributions. It is traditionally used in migration models where utility includes an iid random component varying between individuals and countries of destination (see Grogger and Hanson, 2008) . 5 The Logistic or Normal distributions will be used in the robustness analysis.
Since this function has two country-specific parameters, we need two observations to calibrate them. For each developing country, we can compute ε j ≡ lnĀ − ln A − α ln k j and observe G j in 2000. This gives a first pair(ε j , G j ) which can be used to identify the parameters of the distribution. We need another reference pair (ε min , G min ) which characterize the hypothetical brain drain rate G min obtained with low poverty level ε min . In the benchmark, we assume that at the level of the US income (ε U S ), the brain drain of each developing country would equal the US brain drain (G U S ). This allows us to calibrate (m j , b j ) as following:
The coefficients (m j , b j ) capture the mean of migration costs and the average sensitivity of migration to income differentials. Given (18) and (19), m j and b j are perfectly collinear. The recent empirical literature on international migration reveals that the propensity to emigrate is a function of the distance to OECD countries, language spoken, country size and cultural links with potential destinations, etc. A simple correlation analysis reveals that m j (and hence b j ) is positively correlated with population size (0.32) and distance to OECD (0.20), and negatively correlated with dummies capturing former colonial ties (-0.43), knowledge of English (-0.26) and being a oil producing country (-0.10).
Consequently, the mean of the distribution is low in small states and small islands, and in regions such as Central America and the Caribbean, Northern and Southern Africa, the new members of the European Union and countries located in the neighborhood of the Persian Gulf states. On the contrary, m j is higher in the ex-Soviet block, in South-East and Eastern Asia, in many countries of South America and Central Africa.
Benchmark configurations
The calibration of country-specific parameters allows us to draw the dynamic correspondence (8) for each developing country, to compute steady state equilibria and check their stability, and to compare the observed equilibrium path to the alternative one when multiplicity occurs. Our numerical exercise is conducted on 147 developing countries and gives the following results.
All countries except Croatia and Saint Kitts and Nevis are characterized by 2 locally stable steady state equilibria, the "low-brain-drain" steady state equilibrium (z − , G − ) and the "high-brain-drain" steady state equilibrium (z + , G + ).
6 Figure 2 represents the dynamic correspondence for two countries, Guatemala and Trinidad and Tobago. In Guatemala, the observed dynamics lie on the upper part of the correspondence, i.e. on the low-brain-drain dynamics. If they stay on the same path, dynamics will converge monotonically to a steady state, at the intersection of this path with the 45 degrees line. In Trinidad and Tobago, the observed dynamics lie on the lower part of the correspondence, i.e. on the high-brain-drain dynamics. If they stay on the same path, dynamics will converge with damped oscillations to a steady state. At each date, another path with lower brain drain is possible, though.
Large countries exhibit high migration costs. Considering the 105 countries with more than 2 million inhabitants, the observed equilibrium in 2000 (z 00 , G 00 ) is on the good path in the vast majority of cases, as for Guatemala above. Only two cases are on the bad path. Jamaica exhibits a brain drain of 84.7 percent. Remaining on the bad path, its brain drain would reach 86.3 percent in 2025 and 86.2 percent at the steady state. Moving on the good path would reduce the long-run brain drain to 3.0 percent. Haiti exhibits a brain drain of 83.4 percent. Remaining on the bad path, its brain drain would reach 86.0 percent in 2025
6 In Croatia, (z + , G + ) is unstable. As stressed above, in Saint Kitts and Nevis the oblique asymptote on Figure 1 has a slope higher than one implying that dynamics can be possibly unbounded. The 103 other countries with population above 2 million are on the good path. The bad path is usually a trivial situation with more than 95 percent of brain drain and high poverty.
We have 14 exceptions for which the bad path involves a brain drain below 90 percent (See Table 2 ). In these countries, a major adverse shock could have damaging long-run effects on the economy if it gives rise to a sudden and uncoordinated emigration of the highly skilled. These are Dominican Republic (5.5 vs 85.6 percent) Regarding the 42 small states with less than 2 million inhabitants, the configuration is mixed.
On the one hand, 22 small states are on the good path (z − , G − ) in 2000. Table 3 lists these countries and give their equilibrium in 2025 and at the steady state, provided that they remain on the good path. Except Solomon islands, the brain drain is expected to decrease in these countries; the average emigration rate in this group amounts to 29.6 percent in 2000 and will reach 18.3 percent in the long-run (23.0 percent in 2025). The alternative brain drain rate is below 90 percent in 11 countries which face important risks of coordination failure. On the other hand, 20 small states are on the bad path (z + , G + ) in 2000. Table 4 7 Numbers in parentheses are G shows that the emigration rate will increase in all these countries; the average rate equals 69.5 percent in 2000 and will reach 75.9 percent in the long-run (76.9 percent in 2025).
For other countries with population above 2 million, we predict a significant decrease in the brain drain, provided that they remain on the same branch of the dynamic path. Exceptions are Jamaica and Haiti (on the bad path), Pakistan and Nigeria. The average emigration rate is equal to 19.1 percent in 2000. It will reach 15.5 percent in 2025 and 12.6 percent in the long-run.
In sum, according to our model, 22 countries (including 20 small states, Jamaica and Haiti) suffer from a coordination failure. By repatriating highly skilled natives working abroad, they would reach a productivity level inciting high-skill workers to stay and generating more human capital accumulation. This represents 15 percent of the sample, but 47.6 percent of countries with less than 2 million inhabitants. Hence, coordination failure leading to massive high-skill emigration is an important problem when migration costs are low. In 25 other cases, the risk of a coordination failure is high.
Robustness
In this section, we analyze to robustness of our results to the identifying strategy and to the brain gain mechanism, which implies the endogeneity of q j . 
Robustness to identifying assumptions
Our benchmark numerical exercise is based on three major identifying assumptions:
• The elasticity of productivity to human capital is estimated on a sample of developing countries. We obtained α= 0.277. Using the full sample of 195 countries, the elasticity goes up to α = 0.447. A priori, a higher α can reinforce the possibility of multiple equilibria since it increases the sensitivity of economic performances to high-skill emigration.
• Individual migration costs are assumed to follow a Gumbel cumulative distribution function. In this section, we consider two other distributions characterized by two location and dispersion parameters, the Logistic and the Normal distributions.
• The identification of the parameters of the migration costs' distribution relies on the hypothesis that at the US income level (ε U S = −0.013), developing countries would have the same brain drain than the US (i.e. G U S = 0.005). Since most cases of coordination failure are obtained for small states, one may expect the minimal brain drain of these countries to exceed the US level at high income. In this section, we identify the parameters of the distribution on the Qatar income and brain drain levels (ε Qat = −0.382 and G Qat = 0.023), Qatar being a small states with about 745,000 inhabitants according to our definition.
In Table 5 , we identify the cases of coordination failures in 12 scenarios: 2 values for α×3 distributions × 2 values for (ε min , G min ). Unsurprisingly, the number of coordination failures increases when α = 0.447, and decreases when the parameters of the migration costs' distribution are calibrated on Qatar. The use of the Normal distribution (and Logistic to a lower extent) also reduces the number of countries on the bad path. 
Robustness to "brain gain" channel
As stated in the introduction, a recent wave of brain drain research has emerged since the mid-1990s around the idea that highly skilled emigration generates positive feedback effects for sending countries. In particular, it has been demonstrated that high-skill migration prospects can foster domestic enrolment in education in developing countries, raising the possibility for a brain drain to be beneficial to the source country (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1998; Beine et al., 2001 Beine et al., , 2008 .
The latter "brain gain" hypothesis can be introduced in our model by endogenizing q j as a function of the current emigration rate. In line with the recent "brain gain" literature , a simple regression of identified q j (obtained from (17)) on observed high-skill emigration rates G j shows a positive and highly significant relationship (p-value below 1 percent). We have q j = C + 0.095 G j + η j where C is the intercept and η j is a error term. Defining q 0,j ≡ C + η j as a country-specific constant, we obtain an identified model matching observations and compatible with the new "brain gain" view. The 'brain gain' variant is made of equations (6) and (7) from definition 2, and the following training technology (subscript j is removed to be compatible with definition 2):
Contrary to the benchmark model, the long-run level of human capital k ss becomes an ambiguous function of the high-skill emigration rate G. To illustrate this, let us first treat G as an exogenous variable and characterize its effect on human capital accumulation. At the steady state, combining (4) and (5) gives
Under the traditional view of the benchmark model, we have ∂q/∂G = 0 and ∂k ss /∂G < 0. When ∂q/∂G > 0, ∂k ss /∂G can be positive or negative. In particular, the high-skill emigration rate maximizing the long-run level of residents' human capital is positive if [∂k ss /∂G] G=0 > 0. This requires 0.095(1 − n) > q 0 (1 − q 0 ), i.e. q 0 < 0.039 since n = 0.605 in our calibration. This condition is very simimar to that of Beine et al (2008) . Such a situation is obtained in 64 developing countries (out of 147). More generally, the growth-maximizing high-skill emigration rate G * is the solution of ∂k ss /∂G = 0; our numerical experiment reveals that G * is a decreasing and non-linear function of q 0 which can be approximated by the linear function: G * = 0.411 − 10.12 q 0 .
However, G is clearly endogenous and determined by our system (6 )- (7)- (20). Solving this system for the 147 developing countries in our sample and provided that countries remain on the same path than in 2000, we show that the long-run high-skill emigration rate resulting from utility maximization is lower than G * in 57 cases (i.e. 38.8 percent of our sample).
This result is obtained with the benchmark hypotheses: Gumbel distribution, identification of the parameters of the distribution of migration costs based on the US, and α = α = 0.277.
The key question is: Does the brain gain channel modify the number of coordination failures? In the previous model disregarding the brain gain channel, the low brain drain equilibrium was always better than the high brain drain solution in terms of economic performances at origin. Accounting for brain gain effect, it is now theoretically possible that the high brain drain equilibrium generates higher human capital and productivity at origin than the low brain drain one. Figure 3 shows that the dynamic correspondence changes compared to the model with exogenous q j (see Figure 2) . For low level of ex ante human capital z t , the high brain drain path (dark grey curve) is conducive to more ex ante human capital next period than the low brain drain path (light grey curve). However, our numerical results reveals that the high brain drain path always corresponds to the case with low ex post human capital and high poverty.
Finally, the last column in Table 5 shows that the brain gain channel does not modify the number of coordination failure compared to the benchmark scenario of the first column.
Conclusion
When skilled households expect their home country to have low productivity and to be poorly governed, the most mobile of them will move to a better place. This can only reinforce the bad features present at home. On the contrary, if people expect high productivity and good governance, they will stay, promoting thereby high productivity, good governance, and wealth accumulation.
Such vicious or virtuous circles seem to arise very naturally when one takes into account the relationship between brain drain and development level in the home country. We accordingly built a model which is open to the possibility of multiple equilibria. We derived theoretical conditions under which they effectively arise. Identifying country-specific parameters in the data, we classified countries into different categories depending on whether multiple equilibria are possible, and whether the observed situation might be one of high brain drain and high poverty.
For a majority of countries, the observed equilibrium has higher income than the other possible ones. For 22 developing countries (20 small states, Jamaica and Haiti), poverty and high brain drain are worsened by a coordination failure. By repatriating highly skilled natives working abroad, they would reach a productivity level inciting high-skill workers to stay and generating more human capital accumulation. In 25 other countries following the low brain drain path, there exists a reasonable high brain drain path involving higher emigration rate and poverty. In these countries, a major adverse shock could have damaging long-run effects on the economy if it gives rise to a sudden emigration of the highly skilled.
